XRP Ledger fixed bug that could have created billions of XRP

Phuong-Linh Nguyen

A flaw in the XRP Ledger’s payment system could have allowed an attacker to create new XRP without paying for it, but RippleX says it found no evidence that the vulnerability was exploited on a public network.

The bug was fixed on 25 September, after researcher Cayden Liao and Veria AI reported it internally on 22 September. RippleX, Ripple’s developer arm, reproduced the attack on a standalone server and confirmed that XRP created through the exploit could be spent in a later transaction.

How the payment exploit could work

The attack depended on using hundreds of accounts to submit offers involving small amounts of another token in exchange for unusually large amounts of XRP. The attacker could then send one payment designed to take up all those offers at once.

The total XRP due across the offers could exceed what the software counted correctly. In that case, the accounts selling XRP would receive the amount they had requested, while the account making the purchase would be charged almost nothing. The difference would be newly created XRP, rather than tokens transferred from an existing holder.

That result would have broken the ledger’s fixed-supply rule. XRP’s entire supply of 100 billion was created when the ledger launched in 2012, and the software is designed to prevent any additional tokens from being issued.

The exploit was not described as a simple transaction that any account could submit. It required specially constructed offers distributed across hundreds of accounts. The source says setting them up would have required only a few hundred XRP in account reserves and fees, with most of that expenditure recoverable.

Why the existing checks were insufficient

Why the existing checks were insufficient

The ledger checks after each transaction that no XRP has been added to the supply. But this safeguard relied on the same incorrectly counted total, so it could have failed to detect the inflation. A separate limit on the XRP an individual account could receive would not have stopped the attack either: the attacker could spread the receipts across hundreds of accounts.

That distinction matters for how the bug was structured. Neither safeguard was described as absent. Instead, the transaction could evade both checks because one depended on the miscount and the other applied account by account, while the attack distributed the XRP.

Discovery, repair and exposure

Discovery, repair and exposure

After receiving the report, RippleX engineers reproduced the issue on a standalone server. Their test established that the newly created XRP would not merely appear in a calculation: it could be spent in a subsequent transaction.

Developers released a fix on 25 September but did not disclose at the time what it addressed. RippleX later said it had found no evidence that the flaw had been used on any public network. The available information therefore describes a confirmed vulnerability and a tested exploit, not a recorded creation of unauthorised XRP on the live ledger.

The source says the flaw had reportedly remained in the system for about ten years. It does not provide a detailed account of the affected software versions, the precise change in the patch or the review process that failed to identify the issue earlier. Those details cannot be inferred from the fact that the vulnerability was reproduced and fixed.

What XRP holders and traders can conclude

For holders, the central practical distinction is between a flaw that could have diluted the supply and evidence that dilution actually happened. RippleX reported no evidence of exploitation on a public network, and the bug has been patched. The account does not indicate that existing XRP balances were altered or that additional tokens entered circulation.

The vulnerability nevertheless concerned a core assumption behind XRP: that the supply cannot grow beyond the 100 billion tokens created at launch. Had the exploit been used successfully on a public network, spendable XRP not backed by an existing balance could have undermined that assumption. The reported fix and absence of detected public exploitation mean the source does not establish that such an event occurred.

No XRP price figures or market reaction are supplied, so the financial effect on trading cannot be quantified from the available information. For market participants, the confirmed practical facts are narrower: RippleX reproduced the issue, developers patched it on 25 September, and the reported public-network review found no evidence of exploitation.